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INTRODUCTION
Early childhood experiences are often thought to be crucial determinants of children's cognitive and noncognitive development (Heckman, 2008) . Many children in the developing world are exposed to a multitude of risk factors, hampering their cognitive development from very early on (GranthamMcGregor et al. 2007 ). This is often thought to lead to subsequent lack of human capital accumulation, resulting in poverty and continued inequality. A lot of recent policy interest therefore has focused on policies that can improve health, nutrition and educational outcomes during early childhood and beyond.
As many studies find a strong relationship between mother's characteristics and children's cognitive and educational outcomes, policies addressing constraints on the mothers of these children are often believed to be particularly promising (World Bank, 2011) . Even if those relationships are not necessarily causal (see Duflo 2012) if women have stronger preferences for human capital investments (Thomas 1990 (Thomas , 1993 , policies that increase women's decision-making power could potentially have large implications for children's human capital. Very little is known about the impact of such policies on children's learning outcomes.
To analyze this issue, this paper analyzes the impact of women's representation in elected bodies on children's human capital and tests whether political reservation for women resulted in improvements in children's longer-term educational and nutritional outcomes. The 73rd Amendment of the Constitution of India of 1992 prescribes that one third of the seats in all local council councils, as well as one third of the Pradhan (leadership) positions, must be reserved for women. a Exploiting the random allocation of the seats reserved for women in local elections, several studies have shown that these reservations had important impacts on policy choices. Chattopadhayay and Duflo (2004) show that female reservation increased investment in infrastructure related to the expressed development priorities of women in West
Bengal and Rajasthan. Duflo and Topalova (2004) further show for a sample covering 24 states that GPs reserved for women invest more in public goods, and that the measured quality of these goods is at least as high as in non-reserved villages. This is particularly the case for drinking water infrastructure. Beaman et al. (2009) show that reservation for women has not only led to a decrease in bias amongst voters against women candidates, but has also resulted in a subsequent increase in the percentage of women local leaders in the state of West Bengal. More broadly, political reservation for the Scheduled caste, Scheduled Tribe and women has also been linked to more policy influence for these groups (Pande, a Seats in council and Pradhan positions were also reserved for the two disadvantaged minorities in India, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, in the form of mandated representation proportional to each minority's population share in each district.
2003). Pande and Ford (2011) further show the effectiveness of quotas in changing attitudes towards women leaders and giving them more policy influence. And potentially important, exposure to female leaders can raises parents' aspirations for their girls (Beaman et al., 2012) .
These results suggest that there are a number of different mechanisms through which the reservation policy could affect children's human capital. If female leaders indeed favor policies beneficial to human capital, they could increase investments in education and health care infrastructure. They may also affect children's food intake, for instance by increasing the delivery of food through mid-day meal programs in schools or by increasing the number of households benefitting from public food distribution system. But giving women political power does not necessarily lead to better human capital investments, as it is not automatically true that women would favor such investments (Duflo, 2012) . That said, even if women focus more directly on their own needs, such as their access to food and preventive health care, this could result in indirect benefits for children, in particular through better protection during the critical in utero period. And the shift in educational aspirations could further enhance such effects.
Existing empirical evidence on the impacts of female leaders in India indicates that several of these mechanisms could be at play. Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras (2011) achievement, and their physical growth (height and weight). We are able to attribute causality to the reservation policy in the Panchayat as the seats to be reserved were randomly allocated through a rotating mechanism. Since GPs were randomly selected for reservation, differences between investment decisions by reserved versus unreserved GPs can be attributed to the policy.
The results show that children in GPs that were randomly reserved for women prior to the child's birth have significantly better outcomes on test scores when compared to GPs that were reserved after the child turned 5. These results are explained by better nutrition and health outcomes very early in childhood. As such, this paper contributes to the literature on the long-term impacts of early life interventions (Barnett, 1995; Garces, Thomas and Currie, 2002; Walker et al., 2005; Maluccio et al., 2009; Barham, 2012) and the critical periods for such interventions (Barker 1992; Adair 1999 , Doyle et al. 2009 Almond and Currie, 2010; Barham, Macours and Maluccio, 2013) . Further exploiting the rich panel nature of the YLS survey, we also shed light on schooling outcomes and aspirations as other intermediate mechanisms that
can help explain the impacts of differential timing of reservations. As such, this paper relates to other recent work investigating the relationship between schooling and learning (Beatty and Pritchet, 2013 ) and on educational aspirations (Krishnan and Krutikova, 2012; Bernard, et al., 2013; Serneels and Dercon, 2013) . Finally, understanding the impact of women's reservation policy on children's human capital accumulation is arguably of high interest given existing evidence on children's delays in physical growth, cognition and educational outcomes in India. Stunting rates, for instance, remain particularly high in India (as in our sample), despite economic growth (Deaton and Dreze, 2009 ).
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the data sources and the various variables we look at, section 3 discusses the reservation policy, the random allocation of seats, and identification. Section 4 then discusses the impact of having a women legislator on child learning. 
IDENTIFICATION and EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
The Panchayat is a system of village-level ( The Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Raj act of 1994 mandates that the office of Sarpanch of the GPs in the state be reserved in the following manner: a) Of the total number of GPs in the state, the State election commissioner shall reserve number of GPs for Scheduled caste and Scheduled tribe, such that the proportion of reserved GPs to total GPs reflect the ratio of SC/ST population to the total population. b) This reservation of seats for SC/ST has to be done by rotation, which implies that a GP reserved for SC/ST in first election year is not to be reserved for SC/St in the next election year. An exception to this case though is possible in theory subject to the constraint that the total number of seats reserved must reflect the proportion of population of SC/ST in the state. c) A minimum of one third of the GPs reserved for SC/ST must be reserved for women. This is also to be done by rotation; and d) A minimum of one third of the GPs, including the ones reserved for SC/ST are to be reserved for women. This is also to be done by rotation. 
Details on the random allocation, verification and balance
For identification purposes the key feature of the reservation policy is that the reserved seats were to be randomly allocated. It is indeed this random allocation that other papers on women's reservation in India -as reviewed above -have relied on for identifying the causal impact of the reservation. To rely on the randomization, it is important to verify the compliance and to understand the exact mechanism used for the random allocation in AP. Ban and Rao (2006) describe the process of assignment of women reservation to GPs in some states of South India, including Andhra Pradesh as follows: GPs to be reserved for SC/ST in the first step, and GPs to be reserved for women in the next step are drawn by arranging the GPs in descending order of ratio of population of respective category for which it is to be reserved. Then the first, fourth, seventh and so on numbered GPs on the list were assigned reservation for the first election, 1995 in this case. The second, fifth, eighth and so on GPs are assigned reservation for the second election, 2001 in this case. And the third, sixth, ninth and so on GPs are assigned reservation in the third election, 2006 in this case.
Note that this rule implies that GPs reserved in 1995, on average, should have slightly higher female population ratios. This might be a potential concern for identification in this paper, if higher female population ratios are also related through other mechanisms to children's longer-term outcomes. We therefore analyze the extent to which we observe differential female population ratios between GPs (2011)). We therefore control for mother's education in all regressions.
Empirical specification
We estimate simple intent-to-treat regressions, comparing outcomes of treatment group 1 and treatment group 2, respectively, versus the control. Specifically we estimate:
, where is the outcome of interest for child i in GP g and mandal m. Given the randomized rotation of the reservation, the estimates of and measure the differential impacts of having been exposed to the 1995 and the 2001 reservation, as compared to the 2006 reservation. As such they capture the impact of exposure early in the child's life, as compared to after the age of 5. The vector of child-level controls X includes child's gender and age (using monthly age dummies). Given the lack of a true baseline, we only add controls that likely reflect baseline information: mother's age, ethnicity (dummy variables for scheduled tribe, scheduled caste and other backward caste) and education (highest grade level achievement and a dummy for no education), household wealth and consumer durables indices, and the GP average female population ratio and female population ratio squared. In addition, we include mandal fixed effects to control for all the unobservables that are fixed at the mandal level, . This can be important as many policies affecting child outcomes are determined at the mandal level. g It also controls for reservations at higher levels than the GP.
The outcomes of primary interest are the longer-term impacts (in 2009) of reservation on children's test scores. Z-scores of these tests were calculated by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. We also calculate the average of theses z-scores to account for multiple inferences. 
LONG TERM IMPACTS ON TEST SCORES

Long term effect of 1995 and 2001 election reservation
Gender differences
Before turning to the potential mechanisms underlying these results, it is worth investigating heterogeneity between boys and girls. As the results suggest female policy makers might make different decisions than their male counterparts, one can wonder whether this has a differential impact on boys g The data cover 12 mandals, and on an average there are 4.3 GPs per mandal. The number of GPs reserved per mandal is 1.5 in 1995, with the numbers varying from 0 GP/mandal to 3 GP/mandal. For 2001, the number of GPs reserved per mandal is 1.2, with the variation in number of GPs reserved per mandal the same as 1995 election. As there are a few mandals with 0 GPs reserved, the fixed effects effectively implies dropping these mandals and hence reducing the overall variation in the dataset.
versus girls. One could, for instance, hypothesize that reservation may have affected investments in schooling for girls in particular, in line with potential higher educational aspirations for girls. Moreover, gains of better nutrition in utero might be particularly important for boys (see Erickson et al 2010) . Table   4 therefore shows results on test scores for boys and girls separately. Overall we do not find substantial differences in impacts on test scores between boys and girls for the 1995 reservation. While the point estimates for some of the individual tests differ, none of the differences is significant. And the results on the average test score are similar in magnitude. Differences for the 2001 reservation appear larger, with in particular a number of negative coefficients for boys and not girls. Yet overall these differences are also not significant.
MECHANISMS
There are a number of potential mechanisms through which reservation and the differences in the timing of the reservation could lead to differential outcomes for test scores. Indeed the literature has shown that reservation can affect several policy choices relevant for human capital outcomes. We hypothesize that female leaders have different priorities compared to men in terms of investment of local resources. The reservation of seats for women might then for instance lead to better maternal and child health care or might imply more access to programs favoring nutrition. Similarly, a difference in priorities might lead to more investment by women leaders in education leading to better quality of primary schools in the villages in the GP. The three rounds of the YLS survey provide a unique opportunity to analyze those intermediary outcomes at different moments in the young children's life to understand these mechanisms.
Early childhood circumstances
The For the 2001 reservation group, we see no average impacts, which may not be surprising given the short period between the survey and the start of the reservation. Nevertheless, when separating by gender, we note also here positive impacts for boys in particular, especially for nutritional outcomes that could be related to nutritional and preventive health care investments post-birth. Reservation reduced, for instance, the early use of solid food and the presence of diarrhea. The better nutritional environment is also reflected in higher height-for-age z-scores for boys of the 2001 reservation group (Table 6) in the literature as an important mechanism to explain educational gains from female reservation. Table 8 shows Table 7 , we do not see an aspirational disadvantage for the 1995 reservation group. The contrast between the 1995 and the 2001 reservation group could be related to the advantages the 1995 group accumulated during early childhood. But it could also be indicative of a potential h There are no significant differences in the two cognitive tests that were administer in round 2. However, give that these tests were administered right around the transition to primary school they are likely noisy measures of cognition.
13 heterogeneous treatment effects. Recall indeed that mothers in the 2001 reservation group had lower average education levels. While all regressions control for mothers education, this does not rule out treatment effect heterogeneity. Hence potentially the impact of reservation on schooling outcomes is higher when mothers have higher education levels.
Note however that despite these significantly lower aspirations and schooling indicators in table 7 14 this in turn can lead to substantial longer-term impacts. The evidence also suggests that these longer-term impacts might potentially be more easily observed later in the child's life, indicating that evaluations of policies targeting early childhood may need to take a sufficiently long perspective. Future analysis with upcoming rounds of the Young Lives Panel will allow demonstrating whether the obtained learning gains translate in further dynamic welfare gains. Women's Political Reservation, Early Childhood Development and
Learning in India
This paper analyses the long-term impacts of reservation of seats for women in the local body elections at the village level in India on children's learning outcomes in rural Andhra Pradesh. Using the random rotation of seats reserved for women over different election cycles -1995; 2001; and 2006 , and three rounds of a panel dataset -2002; 2007; and 2009 , we analyse the impact of exposure to political reservation during critical periods of childhood. The paper shows that the reservation policy for female leaders had the largest impact on learning outcomes of primary school children when they were exposed to reservation very early in life. The results can be explained by improved health and nutrition in utero and during the first years of life. These results are suggestive of the impact women leaders have on child well-being in the long term.
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